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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chad Schiermeier appeals from his judgment of conviction for one count of grand theft
following a jury trial. For this offense, the district court sentenced him to fourteen years, with six
years fixed. Mr. Schiermeier raised two issues on appeal. First, he argued the State failed to
present  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  the  essential  elements  of  grand  theft  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt. (App. Br., pp.5–15.) Second, he argued the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence. (App. Br., pp.15–26.) The State responded. This Reply Brief is necessary
to address some, but not all, of the State’s arguments. For those arguments not addressed herein,
Mr. Schiermeier respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant’s Brief.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Schiermeier’s




I. Did the State meet its  burden to prove the elements of grand theft  beyond a reasonable
doubt?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Schiermeier to fourteen




The State Did Not Meet Its Burden To Prove The Elements Of Grand Theft Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Schiermeier argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s
guilty verdict for grand theft. (See App. Br., pp.5–15.) Below, the State alleged Mr. Schiermeier
committed grand theft in two ways: wrongfully taking, obtaining, or withholding money from
DARE/PAL or exercising unauthorized control over DARE/PAL money. (App. Br., pp.7–8, 12–
13.)  The  State  failed  to  prove,  however,  Mr.  Schiermeier’s  taking  or  control  over  DARE/PAL
money was wrongful or unauthorized. (See App. Br., pp.8–15.) This sufficiency argument hinges
on Mr. Schiermeier’s sole authority as the manager of DARE/PAL. DARE/PAL’s articles of
incorporation and by-laws vested Mr. Schiermeier, as the manager, with unbridled discretion to
act in the best interests of DARE/PAL. (See State’s  Ex.  11 (DARE/PAL  articles  of
incorporation); State’s Ex. 2 (DARE/PAL by-laws); App. Br., pp.8–11.) He alone could
determine how to use DARE/PAL funds, including for his compensation. (State’s Ex. 2, pp.10,
16–17; App. Br., pp.8–10.) And he had authorization to access the funds in DARE/PAL’s
checking account. (Def.’s Ex. A, pp.1–4; State’s Ex. 31, pp.143–44; See Tr. Vol. I, p.806, L.5–
p.807, L.24.) In light of this authority, Mr. Schiermeier argues the State failed to prove his use or
control of DARE/PAL money was wrongful or unauthorized. (App. Br., pp.12–15.) He further
contends the State’s case-in-chief relied upon the assumption that any cash withdrawals during
winter months and any purchases it deemed non-DARE/PAL-related were improper. (App.
Br., pp.12–15.)
1 Citations to the State’s exhibits refer to the exhibit number, and any citation to a specific page
refer to the pagination of the 548-page electronic document containing these exhibits.
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In response, the State argues Mr. Schiermeier used DARE/PAL money as “his personal
piggy bank.” (Resp. Br., p.4.) The State asserts, for example, Mr. Schiermeier’s purchase of
archery sights, hunting equipment, winter clothing, and hunting books and CDs had no
connection to DARE/PAL’s advertised activities during the summer months. (Resp. Br., p.6.)
Similarly, the State asserts those summer activities did not explain “the necessity or timing for
the large cash withdrawals.” (Resp. Br., p.6.) And, later on, the State argues the jury could have
found Mr. Schiermeier’s purchase of a hunting bow sight and cold-weather hunting gear was not
intended to be or actually used during DARE/PAL’s summer activities. (Resp. Br., p.8.) The
State’s reliance on DARE/PAL’s summer activities is misplaced. First, the State simply assumes
DARE/PAL conducted no other activities because it advertised certain activities in the summer.
(See State’s Exs. 10, 12, 17, 20, 22, 23.) That assumption is insufficient to sustain a finding of
grand theft. Second, DARE/PAL’s advertised summer activities did not represent all DARE/PAL
activity or its use of funds. Mr. Schiermeier presented evidence to show he conducted other
programs beyond the summer activities. (Tr. Vol. II,2 p.1150, Ls.1–18, p.1164, L.20–p.1165,
L.12 (former teacher testified to observing Mr. Schiermeier teach archery and show hunting
movies to students).) As the manager, Mr. Schiermeier had authority to conduct any program he
deemed proper to serve DARE/PAL’s interests, and the advertised summer activities did not
limit his authority.
The State also claims Mr. Schiermeier committed theft because he took money belonging
to DARE/PAL and “spent it on himself rather than apply it to DARE/PAL’s charitable purpose.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.) Again, the State assumes Mr. Schiermeier spent DARE/PAL money on himself
2 There are four transcripts in the record on appeal. The second volume (Volume II) cited herein
contains jury trial days 5–7 (August 30 and 31, 2017, and September 1, 2017) and the sentencing
hearing, held on November 7, 2018.
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without any evidence to support its assumption. The State presented no evidence on
Mr. Schiermeier’s use of the cash. (See App. Br., p.14.)
Along  the  same  lines,  the  State  asserts  Mr.  Schiermeier’s  argument  that  he  could  have
used the items purchased with DARE/PAL money for DARE/PAL activities was not relevant as
a matter of law. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The State maintains Mr. Schiermeier “still stole the funds” to
purchase those items. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The State’s argument again assumes a theft without any
evidence of wrongfulness or lack of authority. Mr. Schiermeier has not stolen any funds from
DARE/PAL if his use of the funds was consistent with DARE/PAL’s articles of incorporation
and  by-laws.  The  State  had  the  burden  to  prove  otherwise  to  satisfy  the  “wrongful”  or
“unauthorized” element of grand theft. It did not meet this burden at trial.
Next, the State argues the evidence of cash withdrawals “leads to a reasonable inference,
if not inevitable conclusion, that the cash withdrawals were theft.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State’s
only evidence to support its conclusion is simply the cash withdrawals themselves. By pointing
to other DARE/PAL activities purchased with the financial transaction card, the State posits the
cash withdrawals were for unauthorized purposes. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State’s very argument
highlights the problem with its evidence—Mr. Schiermeier’s use of the cash is unknown. It was
not Mr. Schiermeier’s burden to prove his innocence and explain the cash withdrawals to the
jury.  It  was  the  State’s  burden  to  prove  guilt.  Unknown use  of  cash  does  not  prove,  beyond a
reasonable doubt, Mr. Schiermeier’s cash withdrawals were unauthorized or wrongful. The State
again did not meet its burden because the mere fact of the cash withdrawals does not prove that
element.
In sum, Mr. Schiermeier disputes the State’s contention the evidence showed “he simply
took and spent DARE/PAL’s money on himself for his personal purposes.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) As
6
the manager, Mr. Schiermeier had the same authority as a director to disburse funds, compensate
for projects, and execute any other measures deemed proper to promote DARE/PAL’s
objectives. By arguing Mr. Schiermeier spent the money on himself, the State has not shown
Mr. Schiermeier’s taking of the money was unauthorized or wrongful (because he had the
authority to compensate), and, moreover, the State has not shown Mr. Schiermeier actually spent
the money on himself and not in furtherance of DARE/PAL objectives. For these reasons, and
those stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Schiermeier respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand this case for a judgment of acquittal.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Schiermeier To Fourteen Years,
With Six Years Fixed, For One Count Of Grand Theft
Mr. Schiermeier also challenges the district court’s decision to impose a sentence of
fourteen years, with six years fixed, for his first offense. (App. Br., pp.15–26.) In his opening
brief, Mr. Schiermeier highlighted the many mitigating factors in his case:  (1) lack of any past
arrests,  criminal  charges,  or  convictions;  (2)  full  compliance  pending  trial;  (3)  absence  of
substance abuse or mental health issues; (4) supportive, healthy relationships with his family and
children; (5) stable employment; (6) positive interests, activities, and values; (7) drastically
deteriorating health once incarcerated; (8) acceptance of responsibility and remorse; and, finally,
(9) numerous letters of support and testimony from long-time family friends. (App. Br., pp.17–
26.) The State does not refute these mitigating circumstances, and its response is otherwise
unremarkable. (Resp. Br., pp.9–12.) For the reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Schiermeier maintains the district court did not exercise reason by failing to give adequate
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weight to the mitigating factors and thus abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
of fourteen years, with six years fixed. (App. Br., pp.15–26.)
CONCLUSION
Mr. Schiermeier respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction  and  remand  this  case  to  the  district  court  with  instructions  to  enter  a  judgment  of
acquittal. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate or vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2019.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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